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Nipped in the Bud: How Legal Disparities
Create Financial Growth Hurdles in the
State-Sanctioned Marijuana Industry and
Why Bankruptcy Courts Can Provide a
Remedy
CAITLYN CULLEN*
A new marijuana industry has emerged in the United
States in the wake of state-by-state legalization of marijuana, and entrepreneurs, investors, and other advisory services are increasingly viewing the marijuana industry as an
area of legitimate business opportunity. However, potential
investors have been hesitant to establish formal relationships with marijuana businesses that operate legitimately in
the eyes of the state but in a cloud of legal uncertainty at the
federal level because the Controlled Substances Act criminalizes marijuana. This Note identifies two economic consequences of the conflicts of state and federal law and suggests
a temporary solution that would allow states to capture the
financial benefits of this industry while the federal government works towards a more permanent, nation-wide solution.
The first economic consequence that this Note identifies
is that foreign marijuana companies have strategic advantages over U.S. marijuana companies. Investors prefer
foreign marijuana companies, particularly those in Canada,
instead of the U.S. companies operating in a similar manner.
Further, some of these foreign marijuana companies have
successfully listed on public U.S. stock exchanges while their
domestic counterparts have not been able to, giving foreign
competitors greater access to U.S. capital markets than U.S
marijuana companies.
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The second economic consequence this Note discusses is
that marijuana companies have been precluded from seeking
the protections of bankruptcy law. This Note also suggests
that federal bankruptcy courts are equipped to address some
of the financial consequences created by this legal disparity.
In doing so, they could provide a greater level of comfort to
investors and encourage legitimate business development,
thus allowing states that have chosen to legalize marijuana
to realize the economic benefits of the industry while the federal government navigates the broader issue of federal policy on marijuana.
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INTRODUCTION
The “legal” marijuana industry in the United States was estimated to be worth $8.5 billion in 2017, based solely on revenue from
the states that legalized marijuana for medicinal or recreational sales
at the time. 1 Despite federal prohibition of marijuana use, distribution, and sales under the Controlled Substances Act, 2 many states
* J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Kathleen Claussen for her guidance and invaluable feedback throughout
the process of writing this Note. I would also like to thank the University of Miami
Law Review for introducing me to such a wonderful group of people to work with,
and the University of Miami Law Review Editors, in particular, for their dedication
and insightful edits. Finally, this Note would not be complete without expressing
my sincerest thanks to my family and friends. They are my sounding board and
constant source of encouragement, and I am forever grateful for their love, humor,
and support.
1
Thomas Pellechia, In 2017 and Beyond, U.S. Enjoys The Highest Legal
Cannabis Market Share Worldwide, FORBES (June 26, 2018, 10:24 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomaspellechia/2018/06/26/in-2017-beyond-u-senjoys-the-highest-legal-cannabis-market-share-worldwide/#15ef8a892d20; see
also Arcview Group, Legal Marijuana Markets Projected to Reach $23.4 Billion,
Employ Nearly a Half-Million Americans by 2022; Effective End of Federal Prohibition is in Sight, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (June 28, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/06/28/1531033/0/en/NEWREPORT-Legal-Marijuana-Markets-Projected-to-Reach-23-4-Billion-EmployNearly-a-Half-Million-Americans-by-2022-Effective-End-of-Federal-Prohibition-is-in-Sight.html.
2
See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812 (2012).
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have forged ahead with their own laws legalizing medicinal marijuana and, increasingly, recreational marijuana for adults. 3 With the
state legalization trend expected to continue, 4 the legal marijuana
market in the United States is projected to be worth $23 billion by
2022, 5 and U.S. investors are taking note. 6
In 2018, Canada legalized recreational marijuana use nationwide. 7 Not only did this ignite reactions in Canadian markets, 8 but
it also sparked reactions from U.S. entrepreneurs, businesses, and

As of October 2019, marijuana is legal for adult recreational use in ten
states plus Washington D.C. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (last updated July 26, 2019). These states include: Alaska
(2014), California (2016), Colorado (2012), Maine (2016), Massachusetts (2016),
Michigan (2018), Nevada (2016), Oregon (2014), Vermont (2018), and Washington (2012). Id. In May 2019, Illinois passed the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act,
which will allow legal sales of adult-use marijuana to begin in January 2020. Id.
Marijuana is legal for medical use in thirty-three states plus Washington D.C. (inclusive of the ten recreational use states). See State Medical Marijuana Laws,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last updated July 2, 2019).
These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and
West Virginia. Id. In addition to these thirty-three states with comprehensive medical marijuana regulations, thirteen states allow for the use of low-THC/high-CBD
products in a limited number of medical situations or as a legal defense. Id. In
total, forty-six of the fifty United States permit some form of marijuana use or
distribution. See id.
4
See Amanda Chicago Lewis, Why 2019 Will Be the Year of Weed, ROLLING
STONE (Jan. 2, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/2019-weed-marijuana-cannabis-what-to-expect-774035/.
5
Arcview Group, supra note 1; see also Pellechia, supra note 1.
6
See infra Part II.A; see also Lewis, supra note 4 (“Corporate behemoths
like Altria (parent company of Marlboro cigarettes) and Constellation
Brands (parent of Corona beer and Svedka vodka) made multi-billion dollar weed
investments.”).
7
Cannabis Legalization and Regulation, CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/cannabis/ (last visited July 13, 2019).
8
See Big Bongs, Little Bang, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018) https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/10/13/the-main-high-from-canadas-cannabis-legalisation-is-financial.
3
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financial markets in the United States. 9 In August 2018, after Canada’s legalization, U.S. company Constellation Brands 10 announced
a $4 billion investment in Canadian cannabis company Canopy
Growth Corporation. 11 This was the “first multi-billion dollar deal
in the [marijuana] space” and it drew support from top U.S. investment banks. 12 The deal was advised by Goldman Sachs and financed
by Bank of America, signifying that “the top-tier bankers have made
their presence known at the cannabis deal-making table.” 13 As states
across America continue to liberalize their marijuana laws, 14 marijuana is shifting “to the mainstream investment sector” 15 and is increasingly being viewed as a legitimate and lucrative business opportunity. 16 Constellation, which prides itself on being “at the forefront of consumer trends,” 17 sees its investment in the Canadian marijuana company as a way to ensure that it is poised for growth in
medicinal marijuana markets around the world, as well as a firstmover advantage in the anticipated recreational marijuana market in
the United States. 18

See, e.g., Steve Gelsi, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs Get Behind Constellation Brands’ Cannabis Play, REAL MONEY (Aug. 15, 2018, 2:05 PM),
https://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/08/15/2018/bank-america-goldmansachs-get-behind-constellation-brands-cannabis-play.
10
Constellation Brands is a Fortune 500 company best known for its iconic
beverage brands including Corona, Funky Buddha Brewery, Kim Crawford
Wines, and Svedka. See generally CONSTELLATION BRANDS, COMPANY PROFILE
1–22
(2019),
https://companyprofile.cbrands.com/assets/dist/CBI-2019Company-Profile.pdf [hereinafter CONSTELLATION COMPANY PROFILE].
11
See Constellation Brands to Invest $5 Billion CAD ($4 Billion USD) in
Canopy Growth to Establish Transformative Global Position and Alignment,
CONSTELLATION BRANDS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.cbrands.com/news/articles/constellation-brands-to-invest-5-billion-cad-4-billion-usd-in-canopygrowth-to-establish-transformative-global-position-and-alignment [hereinafter
Constellation to Invest $4 Billion in Canopy Growth].
12
Gelsi, supra note 9.
13
Id.
14
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
15
Gelsi, supra note 9.
16
See Lewis, supra note 4.
17
CONSTELLATION COMPANY PROFILE, supra note 10, at 5.
18
See Constellation to Invest $4 Billion in Canopy Growth, supra note 11.
(The funds will be used to “establish global scale in the nearly 30 countries
pursuing a federally permissible medical cannabis program, while also rap9
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Regardless of the arguments for and against federal legalization
of marijuana, the current reality is that a new marijuana industry has
emerged in the United States in the wake of state-by-state legalization, 19 bringing with it economic opportunities. 20 Ironically, at a
time when the national conversation is so often focused on strengthening the domestic economy, 21 conflicts of state and federal law22
prevent this industry from realizing its full economic potential. 23 Because marijuana is illegal under federal law, 24 institutional investors
and banks have been hesitant to provide services to U.S. marijuana
businesses, 25 and these marijuana businesses have been precluded
from seeking the protection of bankruptcy law. While the legal conflicts are constraining the potential economic benefits from these
idly laying the global foundation needed for new recreational cannabis markets. . . . [M]anagement views other jurisdictions, including the United
States, as strategic priorities requiring significant capital.”).
19
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20
While the terms “marijuana industry” and “marijuana business” may encompass ancillary services like medical research, pesticide and agricultural services, and marketing services, this Note uses those terms to refer solely to the
cultivators, distributors, and dispensaries of medical and recreational marijuana
in state-sanctioned industries, unless noted otherwise.
21
See generally Proclamation No. 9816, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,457 (Nov. 6, 2018).
[W]e celebrate the Americans who forge new frontiers of possibility and prosperity, and we reaffirm our commitment to creating an environment in which they can continue to drive our
country’s economic success. . . . My Administration is committed to policies that foster entrepreneurship and create
jobs . . . Americans have experienced an overall decrease in
regulatory burdens. We will not let up. Americans deserve a
regulatory environment that facilitates innovation, rewards creativity, and allows the skills and dexterity of our entrepreneurs
to shine.
Id. at 55,457.
22
Compare Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 Schedule I(c)(10),
841 (2012), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26000(b) (2016).
23
See infra Part II.
24
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841.
25
See infra Part II.A; see also Hilary Bricken, Funding and Financing a Marijuana Business, SCITECH LAW, Spring 2017, at 6–7 [hereinafter Bricken, Funding and Financing]; Kevin Murphy, Legal Marijuana: The $9 Billion Industry
That Most Banks Won’t Touch, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:07 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurphy/2018/09/06/legal-marijuana-the-9billion-industry-that-most-banks-wont-touch/#4466e4263c68.
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businesses, they are not stifling demand or investment interest in the
industry in the same way, which is giving foreign competitors a strategic advantage. 26
Despite these challenges, the U.S. state-legalized marijuana industry has a strong growth trajectory and continues to gain social,
political, and financial interest. 27 Consequently, there are economic
incentives for the legal system to address some of the conflicts between state and federal law to allow the existing industry to access
the nation’s financial resources and encourage economic growth,
development, and stability. 28 This Note explores how the disparity
between state and federal marijuana laws creates financial hurdles
to industry growth and, without taking a stance on federal legaliza-

See infra Part II.B; see also Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 545–
47 (2015).
27
See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 6 (“Though marijuana remains federally illegal, more than half of the states have various versions
of legalized marijuana, with at least a half dozen more states expected to legalize
within the next two years. With the growth in legalization, the potential for profits
in the cannabis industry continues to increase at an exponential pace. The 2016
Marijuana Business Factbook predicts the cannabis industry will grow from a
$14–$16 billion market in 2016 to a $44 billion market by 2020—an approximate
300 percent increase in just four years.”).
28
See John Horn & Darren Pleasance, Restarting the US Small-Business
Growth Engine, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/restarting-the-us-small-business-growthengine#0 (“While the small-business universe is vast, its real economic impact comes
disproportionately from a much smaller subset of high-growth firms. . . . [A] subset of
small businesses—high-growth ones—creates the vast majority of new jobs. . . . The 1
percent of all firms that are growing most quickly (fewer than 60,000 in all) account
for 40 percent of economy-wide net new job creation. To provide a sense of magnitude,
high-growth firms add an average of 88 employees a year, while the average non-highgrowth company only adds 2 to 3.”); see also ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., WORLD
BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL? POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING ACCESS 55 (2008),
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/40995831194373512632/FFA_book.pdf (“It is by providing financial services to any and all
firms with good growth opportunities that the financial sector helps developing
economies to grow and to converge on the high-income levels of advanced economies. This is not just a matter of the overall volume of lending: it matters crucially which firms get finance and on what terms, that is, on whether creditworthy
firms of all sizes, both incumbent ones and those that seek entry, have broad access to finance at reasonable costs.”).
26
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tion of marijuana, proposes other ways that the legal system can foster a business environment for this nascent industry to flourish, allowing states to benefit from the full economic potential of the market. Recognizing that there are certain objections to the use of marijuana, this Note does not address the moral and health arguments for
its criminalization. Notwithstanding the highly contested nature of
the moral and health objections to nationwide legalization, this Note
assumes those objections will ultimately be overcome and solely focuses on the business opportunity of the state-sanctioned marijuana
industry and how the legal system can support the realization of its
economic potential.
This Note examines the relationship between institutional investors and the U.S. marijuana industry and identifies access to capital
markets and bankruptcy as challenges that strain the relationship.
This strained relationship creates financial hurdles to growth for the
marijuana industry by (1) diverting available capital of investors interested in the marijuana market from domestic marijuana industry
to foreign marijuana operations, 29 and (2) preventing marijuana
businesses from accessing the federal bankruptcy system, which
creates uncertainty for the already-limited pool of lenders and discourages an influx of new capital. 30 While bankruptcy is typically
associated with failing businesses, the bankruptcy system lends stability to markets by providing insolvent businesses and their creditors with a predictable process to obtain the best possible value in a
worst-case scenario. 31 The state-sanctioned marijuana industry is
still a young industry and has yet to exhibit large-scale financial
downturns, but no industry is completely immune to the peaks and
pitfalls of macroeconomic cycles 32 or the risks of new businesses. 33
The risks are even higher if the industry is precluded from federal
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
31
See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 545–46; see also William Gamble, Significance of Bankruptcy and Economic Growth, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 4, 2010, 6:39
AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/191890-significance-of-bankruptcy-andeconomic-growth.
32
Cf. Eric Rosenberg, 5 Recession Resistant Industries, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/100115/5-recessionresistant-industries.asp (describing certain industries that, while not completely
recession-proof, feel less dramatic effects of economic swings).
33
See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7.
29
30
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bankruptcy protection because businesses and their creditors will
not be able to predict the process and legal remedies available in the
case of a business’s failure. 34
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Controlled Substances Act and other federal laws relevant to investments in the marijuana industry. It also briefly summarizes the process of marijuana
legalization in the United States and factors contributing to the confusion surrounding liability. In the discussion of liability, this Note
focuses on the legal risks to the financial industry born out of the
tension between state and federal laws. Part II explores how these
liability risks affect the relationship between institutional investors
and the marijuana industry. After exploring the industry’s ability to
raise capital in Part II, this Note then discusses the industry’s ability
(more accurately, lack of ability) to access the federal bankruptcy
system when capital becomes too sparse. Part III of this Note proposes that courts create a business environment more favorable to
industry growth by allowing state-sanctioned marijuana businesses
access to federal bankruptcy protection. The proposal is divided into
two parts. The first part argues that marijuana businesses that are
considered legitimate by the state should be eligible for federal
bankruptcy protection because that approach is more consistent with
the goals of bankruptcy. The second part explores how bankruptcy
eligibility could address some of the problems presented by the disconnect between state and federal laws, thus achieving an economically desirable objective without requiring Congress to confront the
larger, more contentious issue of federal marijuana legalization.
I.

CONFLICTING LEGAL STATUS OF THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY
Following the November 2018 midterm elections, thirty-three
states and Washington D.C. have legalized medical marijuana, and,
of those, ten states and Washington D.C. have legalized marijuana
for recreational use by adults. 35 While legalization at the state level
Jay D. Befort, Ongoing Saga of Medical Marijuana: What’s A Bank and A
Debtor to Do?, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2016, at 32, 33–34.
35
See State Marijuana Laws, supra note 3; see also Marijuana Overview,
supra note 3. Under the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
preempts state laws whenever there is a direct conflict between the two, but there
remains unsettled debate regarding the preemptive reach of the federal Controlled
Substances Act over state laws that regulate the use, production, and distribution
34

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

319

has gained momentum and public support, 36 federal law prohibits
marijuana for both medical and recreational purposes. 37 The Obama
and Trump Administrations have expressed conflicting views on the
federal legalization of marijuana, however neither has demonstrated
clear efforts to protect or prosecute state-sanctioned marijuana businesses. 38 Although the momentum of state law is encouraging the
economic development of the marijuana industry, 39 the inconsistent
stance of federal administrations and lack of clear policy regarding
the legitimacy of state-sanctioned marijuana businesses 40 has created apprehension about the criminal liability that may result from
transacting with marijuana businesses, and consequently has a
dampening effect on that development.

of marijuana within their borders. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Scott
Bomboy, Federal Marijuana Policy Change Raises Significant Questions,
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Jan. 4, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/federal-marijuana-policy-change-raises-significant-questions.
While some believe there is a direct conflict that would allow the federal law to
invalidate state laws legalizing marijuana, others look to the Tenth Amendment’s
preservation of states’ rights to create and enforce laws on all issues not expressly
reserved to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Erwin
Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana, 62 UCLA L. REV.
74, 100–04 (2015); Bomboy, supra. Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering clause provides that the federal government cannot force states
to pass certain laws or require state and local officials to enforce the laws of the
federal government. See Chemerinsky et al., supra, at 102–03. Thus, while states’
laws decriminalizing marijuana cannot prevent the federal government from prosecuting offenders of federal laws within those states’ territories, the federal government cannot require the states to pass and enforce their own laws criminalizing
marijuana. See id. The preemption question that the Supreme Court has declined
to address on multiple occasions is whether states’ laws legalizing and regulating
marijuana within their borders create a direct and impermissible conflict with federal Controlled Substances Act. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034
(2016); see also Chemerinsky et al., supra, at 101.
36
A recent Gallop poll estimates that “[s]ixty-six percent of Americans now
support legalizing marijuana.” Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Now
Support Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/243908/two-three-americans-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.
37
See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812 (2012).
38
See infra Part I.C.
39
See State Marijuana Laws, supra note 3; see also Marijuana Overview,
supra note 3.
40
See infra Part I.C.
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A.
Criminal Liability Under the Controlled Substances Act
Under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), it is illegal to
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense” 41 marijuana, which is classified as a Schedule I substance. 42 Schedule I substances carry the
most severe legal penalties and are characterized as follows:
(1) Schedule I.—
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of
the drug or other substance under medical supervision. 43
Depending on the weight or amount of a Schedule I substance,
penalties for manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing marijuana
can range from a probationary period for first time offenders found
with small amounts, to a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment with a fine of up to $10 million for first time offenders found
with 1,000 kilograms of any substance containing marijuana or
1,000 marijuana plants. 44 The CSA directly implicates marijuana
cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses, 45 but the potential federal criminal liability does not seem to have dissuaded these
businesses from entering the thriving state-legitimized markets. 46 In
fact, with 1,025 licensed dispensaries in Colorado as of August 1,

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
Id. § 812 Schedule I(c)(10).
43
Id. § 812(b)(1).
44
See id. § 841; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a)(2012).
45
Marijuana cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses are engaged
in the three specific activities that the CSA criminalized. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
46
See MED Resources and Statistics, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/med-resources-and-statistics (last
updated Aug. 1, 2019).
41
42
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2019, 47 there are now over three times more marijuana dispensaries
than Starbucks stores in the state. 48
Criminal liability under the CSA extends beyond those directly
engaged in the business to stakeholders that support or benefit from
the business in a number of ways. 49 Leasing or mortgaging property
to marijuana cultivators and dispensaries, for example, could result
in up to twenty years in prison and a $2 million dollar fine under the
CSA. 50 It is also illegal to use income derived from illegal drug activities in any business that directly or indirectly affects interstate or
foreign commerce. 51 In today’s technology-dependent economy, it
is a rarity to find a company that does not affect interstate or foreign
commerce through internet usage in some way. 52 If the marijuana
cultivators or dispensaries were, in fact, prosecuted and convicted
See id.
There are 322 Starbucks stores in Colorado. Lifestyle Statistics: Starbucks
Stores (Most Recent) by State, STATEMASTER, http://www.statemaster.com/graph/lif_sta_sto-lifestyle-starbucks-stores (last visited July 13, 2019);
see also Scheuer, supra note 26, at 521–22 (noting the rapid growth of the marijuana industry, evidenced by the greater number of dispensaries than Starbucks
stores in a handful of states with legalized marijuana); see also How Many Dispensaries Are in Denver, Colorado?, 420 TOURS (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://my420tours.com/many-dispensaries-denver-colorado/ (finding the number of dispensaries in Denver outnumbers the amount of Starbucks stores and
McDonalds stores in the city, combined, but this comparison may be slightly
skewed because differing town ordinances on possession lead to a concentration
of dispensaries in possession-friendly towns.).
49
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 856 (a)–(b).
50
Id.; see also In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 803–07
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (holding that a property manager who leased a warehouse
to a marijuana cultivator was engaged in conduct that violated the CSA, which
therefore provided cause to dismiss the property manager’s Chapter 11 claim for
Bankruptcy relief).
51
21 U.S.C. § 854(a).
52
See Brittany Yantis et al., Money Laundering, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1469,
1485–86 (2018). Both financial transaction and proceeds of illegal activity are defined very broadly. Id.; see also JAMES KILLICK ET AL., WHITE & CASE, GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS: READING THE SIGNALS 9 (2014), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/whitecase_globalinvestigations_readingthesignals.pdf (“Many US laws . . . may establish jurisdiction over a crime whenever it involves the use of any ‘means or instrumentality
of interstate or foreign commerce.’ The term is broadly defined by US authorities
and may cover any communication or movement that crosses state or international
borders, including wire transfers, emails, phone calls, mail and travel.”).
47
48
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for violating the CSA, all of the assets of the business—not just the
plants or related products—could be subject to government forfeiture, 53 leaving creditors and entrepreneurs without any collateral or
residual value. 54 This potential confiscation of assets decreases their
value as collateral to lenders. 55 Furthermore, the financial risk of asset forfeiture may be compounded with criminal liability under the
continuing criminal enterprise provision of the CSA. 56 If the nature
of a relationship between a stakeholder and marijuana business is
criminalized under the CSA, the actions of the stakeholder could be
seen as a continuing series of violations which would render the
stakeholder as one “engag[ed] in a continuing criminal enterprise.” 57 Such a finding could severely increase criminal penalties
beyond what could have been imposed for the underlying violation,
adding criminal liability risks on top of the financial risk of collateral seizure. 58
B.

Investors’ Criminal Liability Under Anti-Money
Laundering Laws
In addition to the array of activities criminalized by the CSA, 59
marijuana business stakeholders, like investors and financial service
providers, may encounter risks with other federal laws because of
the federal prohibition of marijuana. 60 The federal anti-money laundering statutes impose criminal liability on anyone who engages in

See 21 U.S.C. § 853.
See Befort, supra note 34, at 33; see also Bricken, Funding and Financing,
supra note 25, at 7.
55
See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7 (describing how
marijuana businesses are vulnerable to asset forfeiture, creating financial, as well
as criminal risks for lenders).
56
See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). An individual found to be in violation of the continuing criminal enterprise statute will be subject to both asset forfeiture and increased prison and fines sentences. Id.
57
Id. An action is considered part of the continuing series of violations if (1)
the action itself is a felony, (2) it is undertaken with at least five other people with
whom the defendant has a managerial or supervisory relationship, and (3) a substantial amount of income is derived from the action. Id.
58
See id.; see also Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7.
59
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848.
60
See Befort, supra note 34, at 32.
53
54
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a financial transaction knowing that the money involved is the “proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.” 61 Since the growing and
selling of marijuana is illegal under federal law, 62 any bank, investor, or supplier who accepts money from such a business could be
liable for money laundering. 63 While the initial act of a bank lending
or investing in a marijuana business might not trigger money laundering laws because the funds flowing from the bank to the businesses are presumably still untainted, a bank’s subsequent acceptance of loan repayments reverses the flow of funds. 64 Once the
funds flow from the marijuana business (that is illegal in the eyes of
federal law) to the bank, the payment could be seen as a financial
transaction with illegally derived funds. 65 Thus, under money laundering statutes, banks may loan out money but not get repaid. 66 Such

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2012). Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57, parties on
both sides of the transaction are liable for money laundering, so the legal party
beings used to “clean” the illegal proceeds (financial institutions, for the purpose
of this Note) can be liable separately from the criminal enterprise. See id.
§§ 1956–57.
62
21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
63
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7); see also FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, FIN–2014–G001, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING
MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 4 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance].
64
See Yantis, supra note 52, at 1478–82. The four elements required to prove
money laundering under 18 U.S.C.§ 1956 are (1) knowledge that the transaction
included illegally derived funds (even if the specific type of illegal activity is unknown); (2) the money involved must be proceeds derived from illegal activity;
(3) an attempted or completed financial transaction; and (4) intent either to promote the underlying activity, evade taxes, or conceal the illegal nature of the funds
in some way. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
65
See Yantis, supra note 52, at 1478–82. While the movement of money
through a wire transfer or other means or any transaction with a bank engaged in
interstate commerce constitutes the requisite type of financial transaction for
money laundering, the funds are clean until they cross over to the marijuana business. Once the marijuana business has handled the funds, however, they can be
tied directly or indirectly to illegal activities. See id. Even if the marijuana business uses money from a federally legal source to pay its obligations to the bank,
a comingling of clean and illegal assets is sufficient to jeopardize the validity of
the business’s entire asset pool and, therefore, any transactions it tries to initiate
with a bank. See id. at 1480–83.
66
See Befort, supra note 34, at 33–34.
61
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a transaction is typically considered a gift, not a loan, 67 and is insufficient to attract the capital resources necessary for industry
growth. 68
Furthermore, a violation of anti-money laundering laws is also
considered a violation of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) laws. 69 In the most extreme cases, such a violation “could
ultimately lead to termination of FDIC insurance” for the violating

A gift is defined as “[t]he voluntary transfer of property to another without
compensation,” or “[a] thing so transferred” while a loan is defined as “[a] thing
lent for the borrower’s temporary use; esp., a sum of money lent at interest.” Compare Gift, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), with Loan, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
68
Cf. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., supra note 28 (describing how economic growth
relies on availability of credit and financing). A gift could still trigger liability directly
under the CSA as aiding and abetting or conspiring with an illegal business. See
Brad Scheick, Do You Feel Lucky, Bankers? The Shaky Prospects for Financial
Transactions with Marijuana-Related Businesses, 28 MILLER & STARR REAL EST.
NEWSALERT 459, 460 (2018).
69
See Scheick, supra note 68, at 462. The FDIC is a government agency that
provides stability to the United States financial system by insuring bank deposits
of $250,000 per customer per bank. Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/insurance.html (last updated Jan. 29, 2018). Even if a bank fails, customers’ savings and checking account balances are still protected by the U.S. government through the FDIC. Id.
FDIC insurance is a crucial consumer protection tool and has become very common at banks across the nation. See Chizoba Mora, Are All Bank Accounts Insured
by the FDIC?, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated May 27, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/fdic-insured-bank-account.asp.
Almost all consumer banks are FDIC insured, but cash transfer apps like Venmo
are not. See id.; Lauren Lyons Cole, Venmo Just Settled with the FTC Over Allegations It Misled Users—And I Found the Little-Known App That Will Replace It
Once and for All, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:44 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/venmo-apple-pay-cash-vs-zelle-2017-12. Highlighting the problems of keeping cash in a non-FDIC insured account, Venmo recently settled a
lawsuit alleging that it misled consumers by claiming it had “bank-grade security
systems” but was not actually FDIC insured, and, on multiple occasions, prevented customers from cashing-out and caused them to lose money they thought
they actually had. Id.
67

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

325

financial institution, 70 a fate akin to financial suicide for banks. 71
Unlike the cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses directly engaged in the marijuana market, stakeholders like financial
institutions seem hesitant to enter the lucrative marijuana industry. 72
C.
Hazy Enforcement Policies of Federal Administrations
Because of the array of risks the marijuana industry presents to
a growing population of stakeholders, different presidential administrations have made efforts to provide legal clarity on enforcement
policies in the industry. 73 While medical marijuana programs have
existed in states since the late 1990s, 74 state legalization of recreational marijuana did not begin until 2012, with Colorado and Washington being the first. 75 With the momentum of recreational legalization drastically increasing the number of individuals who could
violate the CSA as business owners and consumers, 76 the ability to
criminalize this growing population rests squarely on the shoulders
of federal prosecutors. 77 As the need for federal clarification on the
enforcement of the CSA becomes increasingly apparent, the federal
government’s response has been inconsistent, adding uncertainty to
the risk of prosecution.

70
Bank Secrecy Act Examination Program Overview, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. (last updated Feb. 20, 2009), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/bsa/; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (the FDIC may terminate insurance for a financial institution that has “violated any applicable law,
regulation, order . . .”).
71
See Scheick, supra note 68, at 462.
72
See Murphy, supra note 25; infra Part II.
73
See infra Part I.C.
74
See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 3.
75
See Marijuana Overview, supra note 3.
76
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
77
Cf. Scheuer, supra note 26, at 527–28 (“it is probably safe to say that if
medical marijuana dispensaries are still considered illegal and an option for prosecution by the federal government exists, then a recreational marijuana dispensary
would be at even more risk. In November 2013, one month before the law went
into effect, federal agents raided numerous marijuana dispensaries in Colorado in
what may have been a warning to marijuana businesses set to start selling marijuana to recreational users in January 2014.”).
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1. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH
Without directly endorsing the legalization of marijuana, the
Obama administration supported states’ efforts to legitimize the marijuana industry by clarifying that it would not prevent or undo those
efforts. 78 In 2009, the Department of Justice announced new enforcement guidelines for states that had authorized medical marijuana. 79 The memorandum acknowledged the federal government’s
continued commitment to fighting the dangers of marijuana posed
by its illegal distribution and association with violent criminal enterprises, but clarified that U.S. Attorneys “should not focus federal
resources in [their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for
the medical use of marijuana.” 80 This enforcement policy echoed
Obama’s campaign trail promises to respect state laws on marijuana. 81
The Obama Administration reiterated its support for states’
thoughtful implementation of their laws legalizing both medical and
recreational marijuana in its 2013 policy memorandum released by
former Deputy Attorney General James Cole (“Cole Memo”). 82 The
Cole Memo attempted to provide clarity in an environment riddled
with confusion by allocating enforcement responsibility between
state and federal authorities. 83 The memo enumerated a list of specific harms to public health, safety, and welfare and provided that
federal resources would be committed only to the “most significant
[marijuana] threats,” while “enforcement of state law by state and

Id. at 524–25.
DAVID W. OGDEN, DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON INVESTIGATIONS
AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA
(OCT.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
80
Id.
81
See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 524 n.21.
82
See generally JAMES M. COLE, DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON GUIDANCE REGARDING
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (AUG. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter COLE MEMO 2013].
83
See id.
78
79
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local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.” 84 The federal
priorities included the following:
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where
it is legal under state law in some form to other states;
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from
being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana; Preventing drugged
driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public
health consequences associated with marijuana use;
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands
and the attendant public safety and environmental
dangers posed by marijuana production on public
lands; and Preventing marijuana possession or use on
federal property. 85
Though not as robust as a federal legislative change, the Cole
Memo was perceived as providing assurance that industry participants would not be prosecuted as long as they were compliant with
the respective state’s laws on the matter, thus providing enough certainty to allow the industry to flourish. 86
Following the Department of Justice guidance, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) 87 released its own guidance, outlining proper procedures for financial institutions to follow
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1–2 (original bulleted formatting omitted).
86
See id.; see also Steven T. Taylor, High Expectations: Business Keeps
Heating Up in Cannabis Law Area, OF COUNSEL, Oct. 2018 at 17–18,
https://www.hopkinscarley.com/uploads/pdf/of-counsel-cannabis-article-102018.pdf (“‘More and more law firms, including larger ones, are willing to get
into this area,’ Heyl says. ‘They have clients with lots of money that are investing
– and more people are recognizing that the federal government isn’t prosecuting
so as this happens there’s less and less fear.’”).
87
FinCEN is an organization under the treasury department responsible for
combatting money laundering and illegal use of U.S. financial systems. See What
84
85
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when lending or providing banking services to the marijuana industry. 88 After diligently verifying that the business is compliant with
state laws and does not implicate one of the eight priorities of the
Cole Memo, FinCEN recommends that the “financial institution[s]
that decide[] to provide services to a marijuana-related business . . .
file suspicious activity reports (“SARs”).” 89 Since a bank that knowingly conducts transactions with illegally derived funds is engaged
in illegal money laundering under the Bank Secrecy Act, 90 banks are
required to file an SAR any time they believe such a transaction has
occurred. 91 In doing so, the bank assists law enforcement in investigating the criminal activity and mitigates its own liability for money
laundering. 92 However, a high number of SARs filed for the same
customer could indicate a bank’s controls are too lax and could subject the bank to increased regulatory scrutiny and penalties. 93
To differentiate SARs arising from state-legitimized marijuana
businesses from SARs for traditional criminal enterprises, FinCEN
created a three-category system. 94 A “marijuana limited” filing
acknowledges that marijuana is federally prohibited, but the bank
has no other reason to believe the business is engaged in illegal activity. 95 A “marijuana priority” filing acts as a red flag, indicating
that a bank believes the business is not fully compliant with the relevant state laws or that the business might implicate the Cole Memo
priorities. 96 The third category is “marijuana termination,” which indicates that the bank no longer believes it can remain compliant with
anti-money laundering statutes if it continues the relationship with
We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do (last
visited July 14, 2019).
88
FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63 at 2.
89
Id. at 3.
90
Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et. seq. (2012).
91
Id.; see also FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63, at 4 n.7.
92
Gerald L. Blanchard, Reports of Suspicious Activity in Bank Secrecy Act,
in 2 LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PREVENTION § 21:6. (2018).
93
See James DeFrantz, When to Hold ‘Em and When to File ‘Em—A Two
(Feb.
7,
2016),
Part
Series
on
SAR
Filings,
LINKEDIN
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/when-hold-em-file-em-two-part-series-sar-filings-james-defrantz?trk=prof-post.
94
FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63 at 3–5.
95
Id. at 3.
96
Id. at 4.
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the marijuana client because it would be supporting illegal activity
of a company that is not compliant with state laws. 97
On one hand, the Cole Memo and FinCEN memo together
demonstrate the Obama administration’s earnest attempt to ensure
its laws did not stifle the growth of marijuana industries that states
chose to legitimize. 98 On the other, the three-category reporting system requires banks to file continuing SARs throughout the year and
constantly monitor the client to determine if it has switched categories, which comes with significant administrative burdens and costs
that, in actuality, may be prohibitively high. 99 The high regulatory
burden may either dissuade banks from working with the marijuana
industry, or the increased costs of compliance could be passed along
to the customer, increasing the cost of banking for the marijuana
industry. 100 Furthermore, while the Cole Memo was more permissive of transactions with state-sanctioned marijuana industries, the
memo was not a law, and did not decriminalize transacting with the
industry. 101 Instead, it merely changed whether or not banks were
likely to be prosecuted for those transactions, which, ultimately, was
subject to change by the subsequent administration. 102
2. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S OPPOSITE STANCE
Though certain banks have hesitantly begun to enter the marijuana business arena, there is still great uncertainty in the industry,
keeping otherwise ready and willing investors watching from the
sidelines instead of contributing to the economic prosperity of a nascent industry with high growth potential. 103 On the campaign trail,
then-candidate Donald Trump took the position that “enforcement

Id. at 4–5.
See Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66.
99
See DeFrantz, supra note 93; Hilary V. Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Status of Marijuana Banking, BUS. L. TODAY, Aug. 2017, at 1, 2 [hereinafter
Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Status of Marijuana Banking].
100
See Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Status of Marijuana Banking, supra note
99, at 2.
101
See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7.
102
Id.
103
See id. (“Though the federal government’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network in 2014 produced guidelines for financial institutions to bank the marijuana industry, most financial institutions have elected not to participate.”).
97
98
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of marijuana laws was a state issue.” 104 However, following the
2016 presidential elections, 105 federal agencies under the Trump administration seemed keen to abandon the Obama-era’s laissez-faire
enforcement policies, 106 resulting in a heightened awareness of the
risks of entering an industry that is criminalized by the federal government. 107 In 2017, the director of the U.S. Trustee Program, who
is responsible for overseeing federal bankruptcy courts, 108 stated,
“debtors with assets or income derived from marijuana may not proceed through the bankruptcy system.” 109 This is consistent with federal bankruptcy judges’ treatment of bankruptcy petitions in the marijuana industry so far, which have almost exclusively been dismissed. 110 Further adding to the cloud of uncertainty in the industry,
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memo in
2018, announcing a “return to the rule of law.” 111 In his memo, Sessions reminded prosecutors that violations of the CSA may also
Eileen Sullivan, Trump Says He’s Likely to Back Marijuana Bill, in Apparent Break with Session, NY TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/us/politics/trump-marijuana-bill-states.html.
105
Harrison Smith, Donald Trump is Elected President of the United States,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/kidspost/donald-trump-is-elected-president-of-the-unitedstates/2016/11/09/58046db4-a684-11e6-ba59a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.4bc6a9c93c5f.
106
See Sullivan, supra note 104.
107
Ben Curren, With Jeff Sessions Out, The New AG Should Advance Marijuana Policy by Restoring The Cole Memorandum, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:15
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bencurren/2018/11/07/with-jeff-sessions-outthe-new-ag-should-restore-the-cole-memorandum/#709ec4a8705d.
108
U.S. Trustee Program: About the Program, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program (last visited July 22, 2019).
109
A Time to Reform: Oversight of the Activities of the Justice Department’s
Civil, Tax, and Environment and Natural Resources Divisions and the U.S. Trustee Program, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial,
and Antitrust Law, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5
(2017) (statement by Clifford J. White, III, Dir. of Exec. Office for U.S. Tr.),
https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/testimony06082017.pdf/download.
110
See infra Part II.
111
Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release No. 18-8, Justice
Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement; see also JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR
ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 4, 2018),
104
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serve as the basis for prosecuting crimes under money laundering
statutes and the Bank Secrecy Act, 112 confirming a main concern
among financial institutions. 113
Despite Sessions’ notorious opposition to the legalization of marijuana, 114 the actual effects of the rescission may not be so dramatic. 115 Sessions’ one page memo altered national policy on marijuana and restored prosecutorial discretion to U.S. Attorneys, directing them to “disrupt criminal organizations, tackle the growing drug
crisis, and thwart violent crime across our country.” 116 Curiously,
this “new” directive outlines goals similar to those in the Cole
Memo, which stated that U.S. Attorneys should remain vigilant in
pursuit of violent drug cartels and illegal drug trafficking, so prosecutors may choose to act no differently than they did under the Cole
Memo. 117 Additionally, an appropriations bill dictates that the Department of Justice may not use federal funds to prosecute individuals in the medical marijuana businesses who are fully compliant
with their state’s marijuana laws and regulations. 118 Furthermore,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [hereinafter
SESSIONS MEMO].
112
Id. at 1.
113
See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7.
114
Sessions’ fervent disapproval of marijuana legalization is no secret, as he
has stated ‘we need grown-ups in charge in Washington to say marijuana is not
the kind of thing that ought to be legalized . . . it’s in fact a very real danger.”
Curren, supra note 107. When asked about his view on the KKK in 1986, he joked
they were “O.K. until I found out they smoked pot.” Morgan Roger, Jeff Sessions’
5 Craziest Quotes on Marijuana, CIVILIZED (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.civilized.life/articles/jeff-sessions-5-craziest-quotes-on-marijuana/. He later apologized for the comment and denied his sympathy for the organization but maintained his stance on marijuana legalization. Compare id., with Katharine Q.
Seelye, Barack Obama, Asked About Drug History, Admits He Inhaled - Americas
- International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/world/americas/24iht-dems.3272493.html
(discussing
how President Obama has admitted to marijuana use in his youth, famously quipping that he inhaled because “[t]hat was the point.”).
115
Curren, supra note 107.
116
Press Release No. 18-8, supra note 111.
117
COLE MEMO 2013, supra note 82 at 2–3; see also Curren, supra note 107.
118
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.). The bill, now known as the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, provides
that the Department of Justice may not use federal funds to interfere with states’
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FinCEN’s marijuana banking guidance remains valid and continues
to report a steady increase in the number of banks serving the marijuana industry, 119 but, like the Cole Memo, it is merely guidance,
not law, and cannot eliminate liability. 120
Shortly after rescinding the Cole Memo, Sessions was replaced
by William Barr as Attorney General. 121 Barr has stated that he favors a uniform, national prohibition of marijuana, but also acknowledges that obtaining such a national consensus on marijuana may
not be feasible. 122 He adopts a less aggressive stance than Sessions
by taking the position that a new law that allows states to create and
enforce marijuana laws within their borders while maintaining harmony with the federal laws is preferable to the status quo, which
simply ignores the enforcement of certain aspects of federal laws. 123
This is, in fact, exactly what the proposed STATES Act hopes to
achieve by creating a carve-out of criminal liability under the CSA
for marijuana businesses that are compliant with state laws. 124 This
implementation of their medical marijuana laws. Id.; see also Julie Hamill, Protection of Adult-Use Cannabis From Federal Enforcement Passes House in Resounding Bipartisan Vote, CANNALAW BLOG (Jun. 22, 2019), https://www.cannalawblog.com/protection-of-adult-use-cannabis-from-federal-enforcementpasses-house-in-resounding-bipartisan-vote/. This no-interference has been interpreted to prohibit the Department of Justice from using appropriated funds to
prosecute individuals in the medical marijuana business who fully comply with
their state’s laws. Id. This appropriations bill has been renewed each year since
2014, and the proposed amendment to the 2020 appropriations bill would, if
passed, extend this protection to recreations/adult-use state marijuana laws. Id.
119
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, MARIJUANA BANKING UPDATE 1 (2018),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Marijuana_Banking_Update_September_2018.pdf. While the first quarter of 2018 saw a drop in the number of banks serving the industry, likely in response to the Sessions memo, the
market rebounded in the second and third quarters, with the number of banks serving the marijuana industry climbing to 486. Id. at 2.
120
Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66.
121
Sarah Lynch, Andy Sullivan, Senate Confirms William Barr as U.S. Attorney General, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2019, 6:07 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-barr/senate-confirms-william-barr-as-attorney-generalidUSKCN1Q31I6.
122
Nina Godlewski, Attorney General Barr Says He Would Favor Making
Marijuana Illegal Across the United States, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:32 PM)
https://www.newsweek.com/attorney-general-barr-marijuana-law-1392561.
123
Id.
124
See STATES Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. §2 (2019).
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bill, which was originally proposed by Senators Cory Gardner and
Elizabeth Warren, is one that President Trump has said he “probably
will end up supporting.” 125
Marijuana businesses and their associated financial institutions
might operate legally in the eyes of the state, but nonetheless risk
federal prosecution for violating the CSA, anti-money laundering
statutes, and the Bank Secrecy Act. 126 The disparity of marijuana
treatment between state and federal laws is compounded by inconsistent views between presidential administrations and agencies on
whether compliance with state marijuana laws shields marijuana
businesses and their stakeholders from federal enforcement. 127
II.
THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DISPARITIES
As a consequence of the tension between state and federal law
and the confusion generated by successive administrations’ disparate views on enforcement policies, 128 the marijuana industry’s access to financial resources has been stifled. 129 The legal uncertainties that prevent the marijuana industry from realizing its full economic potential manifest themselves in opposite ends of a business’s
financial life-cycle: marijuana businesses have limited access to
U.S. capital markets, where businesses often raise the funding to
grow, 130 and to bankruptcy, where businesses in distress typically
turn for help. 131 As a result, foreign marijuana businesses are gaining an advantage over similarly-situated domestic marijuana businesses, 132 and lenders and marijuana businesses operate beyond the
reach of legal enforcement mechanisms for financial obligations, 133
in the capital markets and bankruptcy realms, respectively.

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Sullivan, supra note 104.
Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66
Id.
See supra Part I.
See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 529 n.100.
See infra Part II.A
See infra Part II.B
See infra Part II.A
See infra Part II.B
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Grass is Greener on the Other Side of the Border

1. U.S. CAPITAL IS INVESTED IN FOREIGN MARIJUANA
BUSINESSES INSTEAD OF DOMESTIC BUSINESSES
First, capital that is ready to be invested in the industry is not
being deployed efficiently. Shortly after the Constellation BrandsCanopy Growth deal closed in November 2018, 134 the Altria Group
announced a $1.8 billion investment in the Cronos Group, a Canadian cannabis company. 135 This deal was financed by JPMorgan
Chase Bank. 136 The parallel Constellation and Altria deals both
demonstrate the interest in and issues arising out of investing in the
marijuana industry. In both, publicly traded U.S. companies made
investments in the marijuana industry with the support of major U.S.
investment banks—but the investments were both in foreign entities. 137
These deals illustrate the abundance of available capital and a
desire by U.S. investors to put capital to use in the marijuana industry. 138 With such high growth rates anticipated from increased state
legalization and large U.S. companies willing to provide bullish endorsements for the product, 139 the natural assumption would be that

134
Constellation Brands’ $5 Billion CAD ($4 Billion USD) Investment in Canopy Growth Closes Following Shareholder and Canadian Government Approval,
CONSTELLATION BRANDS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cbrands.com/news/articles/constellation-brands-5-billion-cad-4-billion-usd-investment-in-canopygrowth-closes-following-shareholder-and-canadian-government-approval.
135
See Altria to Make Growth Investment in Cronos Group, BUSINESS WIRE
(Dec.
7,
2018,
7:15
AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181207005164/en/Altria-Growth-Investment-CronosGroup. Altria is the U.S.-based parent company of tobacco giant, Phillip Morris.
Id.
136
Id.
137
See Paul R. La Monica, Marlboro Owner Altria Invests $1.8 Billion in
Cannabis Company Cronos, CNN BUSINESS (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:22 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/07/investing/altria-cronos-investment-marijuana/index.html; Lewis, supra note 4.
138
See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 530.
139
See Lewis, supra note 4.
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the industry is ripe for investment and prosperity. 140 But willing investors have not been able to capitalize on that opportunity 141 because both the FinCEN Guidance and Department of Justice enforcement memoranda merely diminish the likelihood banks will
suffer consequences for violating federal law. 142 They do not alter
the substantive law to eliminate the criminality altogether. 143 The
uncertain legal environment has forced many banks and otherwise
eager investors to remain on the sidelines grappling with the risk of
being prosecuted or searching for an alternative, less risky way to
invest in the marijuana industry. 144 Currently, that means investing
in foreign operations. 145

See, e.g., Drew Hendricks, 5 Things Goldman Sachs Looks for in a Company Before Investing, INC. (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.inc.com/drew-hendricks/5-things-goldman-sachs-look-for-in-a-company-before-investing.html.
Growth potential is such a key factor that investment in companies in their early
and expansion stages accounted for nearly fifty percent of venture capital investments in U.S. companies over the last five years. See PWC/CB INSIGHTS,
MONEYTREE REPORT: Q4 2018, at 7 (2019).
141
See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 529–30.
142
Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 861 F.3d
1052, 1055–56 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (Moritz, J., concurring).
143
Id.
144
See, e.g., Leslie Picker, Meet the Banks That Are Leading the Flourishing
Deal Market for Pot Stocks, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2018, 4:06 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/25/meet-the-banks-that-are-leading-the-dealmarket-for-pot-stocks.html.
145
See Lewis, supra note 4.
. . . And, since they’re attracting so many American investors,
some major Canadian cannabis companies are now listed on the
more prominent U.S. stock exchanges. These Canadian operators are the companies taking on multi-billion dollar investments from the alcohol and tobacco industries. These are the
companies that small businesses fear, resent, or hope will see
them as an acquisition target. These are the companies that are
already exporting to Germany and Israel, laying the groundwork to dominate the global marijuana industry for years to
come.
Id.
140
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2. FOREIGN MARIJUANA BUSINESSES CAN BE PUBLICLY
TRADED ON U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES, BUT SIMILARLYSITUATED DOMESTIC BUSINESSES CANNOT
Second, because of the inconsistencies between state and federal
marijuana laws in the United States, foreign marijuana growers and
retailers have greater access to U.S. capital markets than domestic
companies engaged in the exact same business activities. For example, to list on a major U.S. stock exchange like the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) or the Nasdaq, a company must be legal in the
jurisdiction where it operates. 146 The NYSE is a self-regulating entity that requires certain approvals and documentation from companies wishing to list, including a certificate of good standing from the
jurisdiction of incorporation, a statement of legal fitness from the
advising law firm, and a statement of financial fitness from the financial auditing firm. 147 State law governs business incorporation 148
and states that have legalized marijuana that have licensing and registration requirements can, in fact, provide a statement of good
standing. 149 The realistic roadblock, however, may be obtaining the
credibility certifications from the law firm and accounting firm,
which jeopardize their own reputation and liability by endorsing a
See Gene Johnson, Canadian Marijuana Company Tilray Has First US Pot
IPO, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 19, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/201807-19/canadian-marijuana-company-tilray-has-first-us-pot-ipo (noting that the
presence of institutional investors is required for such a large IPO and “[t]he lesson is that the institutions will be there if you have a good business plan and your
business is 100 percent legal in the jurisdiction you’re in.”); see also Jeremy
Burke, One of the Largest Cannabis Companies Is Going Public on the New York
Stock Exchange, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/aurora-cannabis-going-public-on-new-york-stock-exchange2018-10 (“To get listed on a US exchange like the NYSE, cannabis producers
have to prove they are not violating any federal laws by shipping cannabis into
the U.S . . .”).
147
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, The IPO Process: Prospectus in
NYSE IPO GUIDE 35, 38–39 (Nicolas Grabar et al., 2d ed. 2013),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/nyse_ipo_guide.pdf.
148
State Guide: Corporation Law, FINDLAW, https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/incorporation-and-legal-structures/state-guide-corporationlaws.html (last visited July 17, 2019).
149
See, e.g., MARIJUANA ENF’T DIVISION, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, RETAIL
MARIJUANA BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION 1 (2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/DR%208548e%20Retail%20Application%201-2017.pdf.
146
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company that they know is violating federal laws. 150 If all the documents are obtained, the company would need to surmount the additional legal roadblocks of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) approval to make a public offering before it can seek
approval from the NYSE to list. 151
As of October 17, 2018, recreational sales of marijuana are legal
in Canada, 152 so Canadian marijuana growers and retailers can, and,
in fact have, successfully listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 153 In contrast, U.S. marijuana growers and retailers that comply with state
laws find themselves in legal purgatory where they may not be prosecuted for violating the CSA, but are also not considered federally
legal and will therefore not pass the rigorous approval process for
listing on the major U.S. stock exchanges. 154 In a political climate
colored by protectionist policies intended to bolster the domestic
economy, the laws governing the marijuana industry result in an
See MAYER BROWN, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: AN ISSUER’S GUIDE 22
(2017),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/d8ba3792-3c20-4cfe859f-124f1c43bfaf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/70e2f333-4c89-4b81bc16-4d16faf864bf/Initial-Public-Offerings-An-Issuers-Guide-USEdition_1117.pdf (“the lawyers for both the underwriters and the issuer will deliver certain legal opinions . . . with regard to . . . no violation of the company’s
organization documents or of any laws or agreements by which the issuer is
bound, [and] accuracy of the disclosures”).
151
See id. at 27–30.
152
See CANADA DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
153
Sean Williams, These 5 Pot Stocks Are Now Listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq,
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/11/07/these-5-pot-stocks-are-now-listed-on-the-nyse-or-n.aspx. Canopy Growth, Aurora Cannabis, and Aphria are Canadian marijuana companies
listed on the NYSE. Id. Similarly, Cronos and Tilray are both Canadian marijuana
businesses listed on the Nasdaq. Id.
154
See Chloe Aiello & Kellie Ell, Tilray Joins Nasdaq in First US Cannabis
IPO, CNBC (July 19, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/tilray-joins-nasdaq-in-first-us-cannabis-ipo-.html. The Nasdaq and NYSE are the
major organized stock exchanges in the United States that require companies to
meet certain requirements to be listed. See id. In contrast, the OTC market is the
alternative to these more reputable exchanges. See id. They have fewer listing
requirements, are not as closely regulated, and are not as transparent as the major
exchanges, so they are typically less desirable. Williams, supra note 153. There
are some U.S.-based marijuana companies listed on OTC markets. See Mrinalini
Krishna, Top Marijuana Stocks to Watch, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/investing/top-marijuana-stocks/ (last updated June 25, 2019).
150
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ironic allocation of financial resources where U.S. assets can be invested in foreign companies but cannot be invested in domestic
companies engaged in the same activities. 155 Furthermore, U.S. marijuana growers and retailers must look to foreign markets to publicly list, and in doing so, may be required to merge into a foreign
company. 156 In either case, U.S. assets are drained from the domestic economy.
B.

If It All Goes Up In Smoke, Investors and State-Sanctioned
Marijuana Businesses Cannot Turn to the Bankruptcy Courts
In the few instances where state-sanctioned marijuana businesses have filed for bankruptcy, their claims have been dismissed. 157 The bankruptcy code does not explicitly prohibit statelegalized marijuana businesses from filing a petition for bankruptcy, 158 but it has been interpreted by courts to prevent these businesses and their creditors from proceeding due to bad faith, for proposing an illegal or infeasible plan of reorganization under Chapter
11, for the inability of the bankruptcy trustee to legally liquidate the
business’s assets under Chapter 7, or under the equitable doctrine of
unclean hands. 159 As bankruptcy courts navigate an environment in
which businesses are legal within their state, are federally recognized for the purpose of tax collection, but are neither federally recognized as legal nor prosecuted for being illegal, these courts are
uniquely positioned to define the ambiguous rights of and relationships between investors and these businesses.
Coextensive with the difficulty of raising capital in the domestic
marijuana industry is the uncertainty of remedies and procedures if

See Aiello & Ell, supra note 154.
See Bill Hutchinson, One of California’s Biggest Cannabis Companies
Looks to Grow Some Green on the Canadian Stock Exchange, ABC NEWS (Jun.
10, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/californias-biggestcannabis-companies-grow-green-canadian-stock/story?id=63529520.
157
See, e.g., Order After Hearing Dismissing Chapter 11 Case at 3, In re
Mother Earth’s Alt. Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct.
23, 2012) [hereinafter Mother Earth Order].
158
Vivian Cheng, Comment, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105, 106 (2013).
159
See id. at 113–19.
155
156
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a business becomes insolvent. 160 As the industry grows, the inevitability that some businesses will not succeed requires lenders to examine their remedies in the event of a business’s failure. 161 Under
normal circumstances, these remedies are governed by federal bankruptcy law. 162 Once it has been proven that a business is not viable
in its current state and has no realistic hope of surmounting its debts,
bankruptcy allows the business to stop, evaluate its assets and what
value it can offer to its creditors, and then move forward free of the
weight of its past financial mistakes. 163 However, the bankruptcy
system is a creation of federal law, 164 and as such, marijuana businesses have not been able to proceed with claims for relief. 165 Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 are the two forms most commonly used for
businesses 166 and a brief overview of each process is warranted to
explain why neither avenue has been open to state-sanctioned marijuana businesses.
1. THE CHAPTER 11 AND CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PROCESSES
The goal of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to form a plan of reorganization with the understanding that creditors will ultimately be paid
back more of their debt if they allow the business to cut some losses,
See Todd Plummer, Research Memo, Smoke & Mirrors: Bankruptcy Relief
Remains Elusive for Marijuana Businesses and their Creditors, 8 ST. JOHN’S
BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO 21 (2016),https://www.stjohns.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/2016-plummer_todd_research_memo_.pdf (“A corollary of
this bloom in industry is the inevitability that sooner or later, some of these companies will seek bankruptcy relief. So as public opinion evolves, laws change, and
jurisprudence develops, one question emerges: can a medical marijuana company
legal under state law seek relief under Title 11 of the United States Code . . . ?”).
161
See id.
162
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 5–7 (3d
ed.
2011),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasicspost10172005.pdf [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY BASICS].
163
See id; see also Bankruptcy: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note 1-3809908, WESTLAW (last visited July 22, 2019) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Practice
Note].
164
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 162, at 5. Congress has the authority to
enact nationwide bankruptcy laws under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The Federal Bankruptcy Code, codified in Title 11 of the U.S. Code,
and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern all bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
165
See Plummer, supra note 160; see also infra Part II.B.
166
See Bankruptcy Practice Note, supra note 162.
160
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pursue a new strategy to continue operating, and pay back loans over
a longer period of time. 167 A debtor can file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy voluntarily or creditors wishing to enforce payment of the
debtor’s obligations can force the debtor into involuntary Chapter
11 bankruptcy. 168 Often, the debtor itself, or the debtor with the help
of a plan sponsor, will manage the process as the “Debtor in Possession.” 169 This allows the business to both remain in possession of its
assets and remain functional while it forms a plan of reorganization. 170 After filing the bankruptcy petition, the debtor has sixty days
to file a disclosure statement including a description of the business,
its financial information, its reasons for filing for bankruptcy, a liquidation analysis, and an initial description of the Chapter 11 plan,
essentially justifying why the business seeks the dismissal of certain
debts under bankruptcy laws. 171 The Debtor in Possession has 120
days after filing the petition to present the reorganization plan outlining revenue streams, sources and uses of capital, and the repayment plan for each creditor, including sacrifices it requires them to
accept. 172 After creditor approval, the reorganization plan is presented to the bankruptcy court judge for approval. 173 If it is approved, the debtor can successfully emerge from bankruptcy and
continue its operations as a re-organized, recapitalized entity with
new repayment plans for its secured lenders and all remaining debts
extinguished. 174 However, if the court does not approve the plan, the
case may be dismissed or converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation. 175
Chapter 7 bankruptcy provides a court-managed process for liquidating all of the business’s assets when there is no viable way for
the business to continue. 176 The key distinction between Chapter 11
and Chapter 7 processes, for the purposes of this Note, is that all of
See id.
11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note
162, at 29.
169
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–07; see also Christopher R. Kaup & J. Daryl Dorsey,
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A Primer, GPSOLO, July/August 2011, at 49.
170
Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 49.
171
11 U.S.C. § 1125; see also Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 50.
172
11 U.S.C. § 1121; see also Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 50–51.
173
11 U.S.C. § 1128.
174
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 162, at 39–40.
175
See id. at 38.
176
See id. at 6–7.
167
168
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the debtor’s assets come under the control of the U.S. Trustee in the
event of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 177 The assets of the business are sold
at auction and the money is used to provide as much value to the
creditors as possible. 178 While individuals’ debts are discharged in
personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, corporations and partnerships that are liquidated under Chapter 7 do not receive a discharge of their debts. 179 The Trustee simply liquidates all of the
business’s assets and pays creditors to the extent possible. 180 At that
point, the unpaid creditors will only be able to recover from the business’s managers and individuals, if the managers are personally liable for the company’s remaining debts. 181
2. DISMISSAL FOR BAD FAITH
Under Chapter 11, the first challenge marijuana businesses face
is surviving dismissal for a lack of good faith bankruptcy filing under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). 182 Section 1112(b) enumerates a list of
grounds for a “for cause” dismissal of bankruptcy and, while good
faith is not explicitly stated, courts have widely read a lack of good
faith in filing a petition as cause for dismissal. 183 In In re CGO Enterprises, a Colorado dispensary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
was challenged by the U.S. Trustee on several good faith grounds. 184
The Trustee argued that the debtor initiated the petition in bad faith,
knowing that it could not produce a confirmable reorganization
177
See id. at 18 (“The primary role of a chapter 7 trustee in an asset case is to
liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets in a manner that maximizes the return to
the debtor’s unsecured creditors. The trustee accomplishes this by selling the
debtor’s property . . .”).
178
Id. at 15, 18.
179
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note
162, at 15.
180
Bethany K. Laurence, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy for Corporations and LLCs,
BANKRUPTCY SITE, https://www.thebankruptcysite.org/resources/bankruptcy/
chapter-7-bankruptcy-corporations-and-llcs.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
181
See id.
182
See Cheng, supra note 158, at 108–09, 113–16.
183
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); see also Cheng, supra note 158, at 108–09, 113–16.
184
United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss This Chapter 11 Case Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) at 2–3, In re CGO Enterprise L.L.C., No. 12-19010
(Bankr. D. Colo. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 1962267 [hereinafter CGO Motion to
Dismiss].
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plan. 185 To confirm a plan, the court must find it is a viable plan for
continuing operations that is “not by any means forbidden by
law.” 186 As the plan would have to be funded by the illegal sale of
marijuana under the CSA, the Trustee argued that the plan could not
be confirmed. 187 The second argument was that CGO failed to file
timely documents, which was grounds for dismissal. 188 CGO withdrew its petition, conceding to the failure to file timely documents,
but rejected the notion that any plan would have been illegal. 189 Curiously, the debtor’s withdrawal was driven by its own concerns
about the feasibility of its reorganization plan due to complications
regarding the ownership of the cannabis plants and ability to include
them in the estate. 190 While “CGO legally ‘owned’ all medical marijuana plants it produced, the applicable state regulators believe[d]
individual plants are only owned for the ‘benefit of’ or on ‘behalf
of’ named individual patients, and the applicable state regulators
[did] not believe that a trustee could exercise any control or dominion over medical marijuana plants.” 191
3. DISMISSAL FOR ILLEGAL OR INFEASIBLE
REORGANIZATION PLANS
While 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) requires bankruptcy petitions to be
filed in good faith in order to seek financial relief and repayment for
creditors, 192 11 U.S.C. § 1129 requires a reorganization plan to be
financially viable. 193 In California, Mother Earth’s Alternative
Healing Cooperative’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition 194 illustrates
See id. at 3.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
187
CGO Motion to Dismiss, supra note 184, at 3.
188
Id.
189
Debtor’s Joint Response to Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss and Order to File
Status Report at 1–2, In re CGO Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (Bankr. D. Colo.
May 25, 2012), 2012 WL 1932712 [hereinafter Debtor’s Response to Motion to
Dismiss].
190
See id. at 1.
191
Id.
192
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012).
193
11 U.S.C. § 1129.
194
Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing
Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jul 25, 2012), http://bankrupt.com/misc/casb12-10223.pdf.
185
186
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the challenges of surmounting the good faith hurdle under Section
1112(b), as well as two key factors a court must find to confirm the
plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 195 Mother Earth openly admitted its
goal in seeking bankruptcy protection was to avoid eviction. 196 The
southern California medical marijuana dispensary was fully compliant with California state laws, but alleged that its landlord had been
receiving pressure from the federal government to evict the business. 197 The judge noted that the “[d]ebtor fil[ing] this bankruptcy
solely to preserve a lease” was grounds for dismissal. 198 Furthermore, to win court approval, a plan must “not [be] by any means
forbidden by law” 199 and must be feasible. 200 The judge found the
only means of funding a plan would have been “by criminally illegal
means,” and the viability of the plan was further compromised because any proceeds the business received under the plan “would
have been subject to forfeiture and, therefore, [were] illusory.” 201
4. DISMISSAL FOR INABILITY OF THE TRUSTEE TO LEGALLY
LIQUIDATE ASSETS
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases have been dismissed primarily because of the inability of the Trustee to legally sell the marijuana assets. 202 Because the bankruptcy trustee manages the liquidation process of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court in Colorado held
that “the trustee could neither ‘take control of the Debtor’s Property . . . ‘ nor ‘liquidate the inventory of marijuana plants . . . ‘ without violating § 841(a) of the CSA.” 203 The court’s dismissal in
Mother Earth similarly refused to convert the Chapter 11 petition to

Order After Hearing Dismissing Chapter 11 Case at 3, In re Mother Earth’s
Alt. Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Mother Earth Order].
196
See Stephanie Gleason, Chapter 420?, WALL ST. J.: BLOG (Jul. 27, 2012,
10:47 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/07/27/chapter-420/.
197
Id.
198
Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2.
199
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
200
See id. § 1129(a)(11).
201
Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2.
202
See, e.g., id. at 3.
203
Plummer, supra note 160 (quoting In re Arenas, 514 B.R. 887, 892 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2014)).
195
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a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding because the bankruptcy “trustee
cannot be forced to engage in illegal activity.” 204
5. DISMISSAL FOR “UNCLEAN HANDS”
In addition to the debtor’s inability to proceed with bankruptcy
claims, courts have also denied creditors of marijuana businesses
access to bankruptcy courts under the unclean hands doctrine. As a
court of equity, the bankruptcy court’s available remedies are informed by the notion that “a plaintiff asking a court for equitable
relief ‘must come with clean hands.’” 205 When creditors brought an
involuntary Chapter 7 petition to force an Arizona medical marijuana dispensary into bankruptcy, they were met with little sympathy
from the bankruptcy court. 206 Illustrating a key danger of the continued tension between federal and state law for investors, the dispensary was able to escape liability for its debts by using its own
federal illegality as a defense. 207 It used the unclean hands doctrine
to argue that its creditors “knew or should have known that
Medpoint’s activities were illegal under federal law” and therefore
the creditors were not eligible to seek relief under the federal bankruptcy laws. 208 Reluctantly persuaded by Medpoint’s argument, the
court ruled in favor of the debtor, finding both unclean hands of the
petitioner and risk for the trustee who would have had to liquidate
the marijuana assets if the Chapter 7 liquidation were allowed to
proceed. 209
Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 3.
Northbay Wellness Grp., Inc. v. Beyries, 789 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944)).
206
See In re Medpoint Management, LLC, 528 B.R. 178, 186–88 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June
3, 2016) (“Medpoint did not dupe [the creditors] into entering the medical marijuana business. . . . Petitioning Creditors may themselves have also violated the
CSA and attempted to profit from those violations.”).
207
See id. at 188 (“The Court has neither the authority nor the will to enter an
order for relief or endanger a trustee who might be assigned to administer drug
tainted assets for the benefit of creditors who assumed the risk of doing business
with an enterprise engaged in violations of federal law.”).
208
Id. at 186–87.
209
Id.; see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 96-97 (describing a case
almost parallel to Medpoint: Judgment of Dismissal, Hammer v. Today’s Health
Care II, CV2011-051310 (Ariz. Super. Ct. April 17, 2012)).
204
205
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III.
BANKRUPTCY COURTS ARE UNIQUELY POSITIONED TO
REMEDY CERTAIN FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES BY ALLOWING
STATE-SANCTIONED MARIJUANA BUSINESSES ACCESS TO THE
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
As social acceptance of marijuana broadens, 210 the business and
legal arenas must work together to create stability. While insolvency
is a fate debtors and creditors alike hope to avoid, 211 the bankruptcy
system has a stabilizing effect on markets by identifying the best
outcome in a bad situation. 212 “The Bankruptcy Code [] does not
explicitly prohibit [marijuana businesses] from filing for bankruptcy” 213 and should therefore be made accessible to the state-legitimized marijuana industry.
A.
Better Alignment with the Goals of Bankruptcy
There are many instances in which discrepancies between state
and federal marijuana laws have created confusion, including issues
of tax violations and employee terminations for positive marijuana
tests. 214 The key distinction between those laws and bankruptcy law,

Id.

The court recognized the absurdity of this result—excusing the
defendants from repaying the loan because they were, in the
eyes of the law, drug dealers—but was unwilling to give the
plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain when the conduct envisioned by the agreement remained illegal under federal law.

See McCarthy, supra note 36.
See Bill Fay, What is Insolvency?, DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/faqs/
insolvency/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
212
See Gamble, supra note 31 (“Bankruptcy is the most important part of any
economic crisis. It is the plumbing of economics. It allows the market to flush
away the inefficient businesses and reallocate capital to efficient businesses.”).
213
Cheng, supra note 158, at 106.
214
For example, tax violations and employee terminations for testing positive
for marijuana illuminate tension between state and federal laws. Alterman v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1452, (T.C. 2018) (finding tax
penalties for under-reporting income valid when the business deducted business
expenses from its gross income—a standard practice for most businesses, but not
allowed for marijuana businesses); see also Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110
T.C.M. (CCH) 408 (T.C. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r of
210
211

346

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:310

however, is that the law in those cases was used to prosecute violations within its reach, while bankruptcy laws are voluntarily sought
out by those who seek to benefit from its financial forgiveness. 215
Even in circumstances where the creditor forces the debtor into involuntary bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court does not weigh criminal
issues, but rather equitable issues of financial misfortunes or mismanagement. 216 Bankruptcy courts serve an economic purpose rather than a criminal purpose, so whether a business can or cannot
access the bankruptcy framework should be a question of economic
benefit rather than a question of legal harmony under the preemption
doctrine. 217 Both Congress and bankruptcy judges have noted that
the bankruptcy courts are courts of limited jurisdiction to address
financial affairs. 218 Bankruptcy courts in the past have limited their
Internal Revenue, 694 F. App’x 570 (9th Cir. 2017) (“we find that petitioner was
involved in the trade or business of trafficking in a controlled substance within
the meaning of the CSA that was prohibited by law during the years at issue. We
hold that section 280E prohibits petitioner from deducting any amounts paid or
incurred during the years at issue in connection with its trade or business that
respondent disallowed”); Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 150–52
(COA 2013) (holding plaintiff’s medical marijuana use, though legal in Colorado,
illegal under the federal CSA, and therefore reasonable grounds for employment
termination); see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 98 n.88 (detailing a number
of cases addressing employment termination after failing a marijuana drug test).
215
“One of the primary purposes of [the federal bankruptcy law] is to ‘relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” In re Perrotta, 406 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alterations in original).
216
See Cheng, supra note 158, at 118–20.
217
See id. at 119–21.
218
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486–501 (2011). The Court held that
bankruptcy courts are not mere adjuncts of Article III Courts and, therefore, the
bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgement on a non-bankruptcy issue was unconstitutional. See id. This is because Bankruptcy Courts are not Article III courts
under the constitution, but rather, courts whose authority is derived from an act of
Congress. See id. As a result, the judges do not have the same salary and tenure
protections as Article III judges meant to protect them from political influence in
their decision-making. See id. To allow a bankruptcy court to decide matters that
are not related to bankruptcy, but are civil rights or criminal in nature, would allow
such crucial rights to be “taken from the Article III Judiciary . . . [and] Article III
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of
powers we have long recognized.” Id. at 495.
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analysis of reorganization plans to its financial feasibility of the plan
and the interests of its creditors, declining to opine on questionable
legalities and suggesting that such an inquiry would be “contrary to
the ‘basic function of bankruptcy judges in bankruptcy proceedings.’” 219 This Note by no means suggests that bankruptcy courts
should open their doors to the black market; rather, it proposes that
where one governing body—in this case, the state—has determined
that it is in the public interest to legitimize an industry, and the conflicting governing body—the federal government—has demonstrated it is not in the public interest to cripple the states’ efforts,
bankruptcy courts should fulfill their economic role by providing a
predictable and organized process for businesses and lenders
alike. 220
Furthermore, the tests applied in each bankruptcy process to determine whether a petition should survive dismissal are concerned
with detecting abuse of the bankruptcy system to hide value or
fraudulently escape liability for debts, not “abuses” directed at determining the criminality of state-approved actions. 221 While CGO
and Mother Earth’s Healing Cooperative’s dismissals both noted a
good faith violation because of the marijuana in the reorganization
plan, neither one was dismissed exclusively on a finding that any
reorganization plan based on the sale of marijuana is unconfirmable. 222 Rather, both cases included additional reasoning that would
have been grounds for dismissal regardless of the marijuana, so it is
not clear that a debtor’s characterization as a marijuana business
alone precludes it from proceeding with bankruptcy. 223 Under a
219

812).

Cheng, supra note 158, at 120–21 (2013) (quoting In Re Food City Hall at

See Gamble, supra note 31 (“To accurately determine the risk of these investments, it is important to look beyond the numbers to the legal institutions that
provide transparency and consistency, because when things go sour, they are your
only protection.”).
221
See Cheng, supra note 158, at 110.
222
See CGO Motion to Dismiss, supra note 184, at 2–3; Mother Earth Order,
supra note 195, at 2–3.
223
Mother Earth had an improper purpose for filing because it was trying to
escape eviction rather than accomplish the goals of bankruptcy, which are to provide as much value as possible to creditors before making a fresh start. See Mother
Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2; see also Debtor’s Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 189, at 1.
220

348

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:310

Chapter 11 reorganization, the court has a fiduciary duty to apply
the best interest of the creditors test. 224 The test considers which assets to pay the business’s creditors with and whether it is in the best
interest of the creditors for the business to continue so it could potentially repay some on an extended timeline or whether the creditors would be better served by liquidating the company’s assets. 225
CGO openly admitted it did not have enough assets to proceed further with Chapter 11 bankruptcy and unilaterally determined it
would not pass the best interest test. 226 However, if a marijuana business’s reorganization plan is compliant with state laws and survives
the best interest test, the creditors should be allowed to benefit from
that plan.
In determining the validity of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
proceedings, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the basic
federal rule in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of
claims” because the debtor’s obligation to pay stems from a contract. 227 The creditor’s right to enforce payment is determined by the
contract between the debtor and the creditor, which is a matter of
state law since “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state
law.” 228 A contract that is illegal is unenforceable, 229 but the federal
prohibition of marijuana under the CSA that renders the contract illegal is in direct conflict with the state law that is determinative of
the contract’s validity. 230 Assuming the business is compliant with
state marijuana laws, the contract is valid in the eyes of the state and
“[u]nless some federal interest requires a different outcome, there is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7) (2012); see also Jonathan Hicks, Note, Foxes
Guarding the Henhouse: The Modern Best Interests of Creditors Test in Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 5 NEV. L.J. 820, 831 (2005).
225
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
226
See Debtor’s Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 189, at 1.
227
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443,
450 (2007).
228
Id. at 451 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) (alterations in original).
229
George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 347, 357 (1961) (“an illegal contract is one that is unenforceable as a matter
of policy because enforcement would be injurious to the best interest of the public.”).
230
Compare Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 Schedule 1(c)(10),
841 (2012), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. §26000(b) (2016).
224

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

349

because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.” 231 Not only does the federal government have an interest in
enforcing the CSA, but it also has an interest in the economic prosperity of its citizens in every state. 232 While a traditional federal
court might weigh the legal harmony interests of preemption higher
than the economic interest, as discussed, it is more consistent with
the bankruptcy courts’ role to focus on the economic interests.
B.

Benefits to Industry and Investors Outweigh the Risks to the
Bankruptcy System
Bankruptcy access alone cannot address all of the burning questions of financial institutions evaluating an investment in the domestic marijuana market, but it is one necessary component of creating
a business environment positioned for growth. 233 A major goal of
the states’ legalization programs is to eliminate the harms caused by
the illegal marijuana trade. 234 If the states hope to drive business
away from the illegal market, the legitimate market needs to be large
enough to absorb demand and to offer prices that consumers are
willing to pay. 235 Otherwise, states’ efforts may be thwarted by consumers turning to the black market for cheaper or more accessible
products. 236 If investors have assurance that they will be able to enforce their loans and obtain their collateral through bankruptcy proceedings, they will be more likely to lend to the industry. As the
Travelers Cas., 549 U.S. at 451 (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55).
See generally Proclamation No. 9816, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,457 (Nov. 6, 2018).
233
See Gamble, supra note 31 (“[C]redit is essential to economic growth. In
game theory, a debtor’s best move is not to repay the debt. Creditors know this
and their best move is not to lend. So without adequate legal protections, economic growth can come to an end.”).
234
See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 158, at 140.
235
ADAM ORENS ET AL., MARIJUANA POLICY GROUP & UNIV. COLO.
BOULDER, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MARKET SIZE AND DEMAND
FOR MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: 2017 MARKET UPDATE 14 –15 (2018),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/MED%20Demand%20and%20Market%20%20Study%20%20082018
.pdf.
236
Id.; see also Jeff Desjardins, California’s Recreational Cannabis Industry
Is Booming—But Regulations Are Posing a Unique Threat, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Aug. 28, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/californias-recreational-cannabis-industry-is-booming-but-regulations-are-posing-a-unique-threat2018-8.
231
232
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availability of funding for the industry grows, so too will the industry’s competition and its ability to fully address demand. 237 Increased competition improves quality and drives down prices, which
ultimately benefits consumers, the economy, and states’ efforts to
drive business away from the illegal drug trade. 238
Even if the legislature were to make an exception to legal liability for banks that lend to marijuana industries, lenders still face the
risk of being left with no way to enforce their loans through bankruptcy proceedings if the business fails. 239 Access to the bankruptcy
system adds security to the market and increases growth by providing a predictable, navigable process for debtors and creditors, thus
allowing the industry to achieve greater scale by encouraging more
lending. It allows debtors in financial distress to start fresh, hopefully bringing some financial management lessons to future pursuits. 240 Further, bankruptcy proceedings allow creditors a legal
means of enforcing their unpaid loans and maximizing the value of
their recovery in the event of insolvency. 241 The continuing recovery
of the U.S. economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis is a

See Desjardins, supra note 236; see also ORENS ET AL., supra note 235, at
14–15.
238
Cf. ORENS ET AL., supra note 235, at 14–15.
239
For an illustration of forfeiture and of how mere promises of safe-harbor
from criminal liability alone are insufficient to encourage meaningful banking activity in the industry, see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 93.
[E]ven if the federal government were to promise never to pursue money laundering charges against those banks doing business with the marijuana industry, it is not at all clear that banks
would actually begin to treat marijuana businesses the way they
treat other businesses. Because the CSA and its forfeiture provisions remain good law, the assets of a marijuana business remain subject to forfeiture even in the face of a federal promise
not to pursue such actions, and it is difficult to see how those
assets could be seen by a bank as sufficiently secure against
government seizure to be worth the risk. It was for this reason
that the reaction of the marijuana industry to the new banking
guidelines was decidedly tepid.
Id. (citing Evan Perez, Banks Cleared to Accept Marijuana Business, CNN (Feb.
17, 8:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/politics/u-s-marijuana-banks).
240
See In re Perrotta, 406 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (quoting Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
241
Hicks, supra note 224, at 831; see also Gamble, supra note 31.
237
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salient illustration of the economic function of the bankruptcy system. 242 More than ten years after Lehman Brothers declared Chapter
11 bankruptcy, launching the tailspin of the U.S. stock market, the
deal negotiated during the bankruptcy process is credited as one that
“helped avert ‘an even greater economic calamity.’” 243 Over $130
billion in claim settlements have been paid and the process is still
ongoing. 244 It is unclear what, if any, recovery creditors would have
had without bankruptcy. 245
The federal government has not actively condoned state-legalized marijuana businesses, nor has it condemned businesses that
openly seek to expand in compliance with states’ laws. 246 If federal
bankruptcy courts were to start allowing marijuana businesses or
their creditors to proceed with bankruptcy claims as regular businesses, there are, of course, inherent risks. Broadly speaking, decisions may be overturned or a circuit split may emerge as bankruptcy
petitions make their way through the courts in each legalized state.
A circuit split would detract from the market-stabilizing investment
security that bankruptcy can provide. However, this would likely
encourage forum-shopping behavior and consequential migration of
funding and the associated growth to states in jurisdictions that provide security in bankruptcy procedures. Furthermore, in finding that
the personal mandate of the Affordable Care Act was a legal tax, not
an illegal penalty, the Supreme Court “estimated that four million
people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather than buy insurance” 247 and reasoned “that Congress regards such extensive failure
to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did
See, e.g., Matt Egan, The US Economy Just Hit a Milestone, CNN (May 1,
2018, 10:57 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/01/news/economy/us-economy-great-recession-recovery/index.html.
243
Lehman Brothers $11bn Case Against Barclays Fails, BBC NEWS (Feb.
23, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-12549242.
244
Renea Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis—10 Years Later, WASH.
POST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/aguide-to-the-financial-crisis--10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.5c5dbcd59242.
245
See id.
246
There has certainly been verbal political condemnation, but to date, there
seems to have been little condemnation actions against those in compliance with
state marijuana laws and federal tax reporting requirements. See infra Part I.B.
247
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 568 (2012).
242
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not think it was creating four million outlaws.” 248 Similarly, there
are currently over 1.2 million registered medical marijuana users in
California and thirty-nine million consumers. 249 Recreational marijuana is now legalized in California, and therefore available to more
than thirty-nine million people. 250 With nine other recreational
states and thirty-two other medical states’ populations, 251 the number of people exposed to the risk of violations under the CSA as
consumers and business owners far exceeds the four million people
the Supreme Court was concerned with criminalizing in NFIB v.
Sebelius. 252 With such a large number of people at risk, it is unlikely
that the federal government would remain fairly passive in the face
of a growing population if it intended for all these people to be considered outlaws.
Additionally, the individual bankruptcy trustees who take control of assets may be exposed to criminal liability for selling marijuana in a Chapter 7 liquidation or for supporting the sale of marijuana
in the event of approval of a reorganization plan. 253 However, there
are a few reassurances that these individuals are unlikely to suffer
the consequences of that risk. A federal appropriations bill does not
allow the use of federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana businesses that are in compliance with their state laws. 254 If the federal
government has determined it would be a waste of money to go after
state-compliant businesses, it would likely be an even more egregious waste of federal resources to prosecute the U.S. Trustees performing the debt distributing functions of the bankruptcy court. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit in United State v. McIntosh allowed a group
of ten marijuana dispensaries to enjoin the Department of Justice’s
Id.
See Medical Marijuana Patient Numbers, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-state-medical-marijuana-laws/medical-marijuana-patient-numbers/ (last updated July 10, 2019).
250
See Desjardins, supra note 236.
251
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
252
See Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 568 (2012).
253
See, e.g., In re Medpoint Management, LLC, 528 B.R. 178, 186–88
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. June 3, 2016).
254
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.); see also Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 6–7.
248
249
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prosecution efforts, finding that the prosecution under the CSA violated the appropriations bill. 255
CONCLUSION
The reality of state-by-state marijuana legalization is that a
quasi-legal marijuana industry now exists in the United States. Legal uncertainties regarding federal liability and enforcement, however, have limited the industry’s access to resources, thus limiting
the economic benefits that states can realize from a prospering and
expanding industry. As the wave of state recreational marijuana legalization gains momentum, the importance of legal clarity on the
issue grows because the missed business opportunities are that much
larger. Federal and state views on the legality of marijuana remain
divergent, but the belief that corporate bankruptcy is an important
strategic business tool is a view upon which the government stands
united. 256 By granting state-legitimized marijuana businesses access
United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).
“The 1978 Bankruptcy Code profoundly changed the bankruptcy system
and its importance in society and the economy. . . . By making bankruptcy more
attractive for corporations as well, [the 1978 Bankruptcy Code] routinized corporate bankruptcy, turning it into a business and strategic decision rather than a last
resort.” Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in
America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2021 (2003). In 2005, Bankruptcy Code reforms to ensure bankruptcy remains a legitimate tool, and not a tool abused by
bad-faith actors to escape their responsibilities passed with bipartisan support. See
BAPCPA: Know Your Bankruptcy Rights, DEBT.COM (May 10, 2019),
https://www.debt.com/bankruptcy/abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protectionact/. The importance of access to bankruptcy, especially for small businesses, continues to receive attention and support from democrats and republicans alike. On
the legislative branch, see, e.g., Press Release, Collins, Bipartisan Colleagues Introduce Legislation to Help Small Businesses Restructure Debt, (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://dougcollins.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/collins-bipartisan-colleagues-introduce-legislation-help-small (quoting Republican Senator Grassley
explaining that “[a] well-functioning bankruptcy system, specifically for small
businesses, allows businesses to reorganize, preserve jobs, maximize the value of
assets and ensure the proper allocation of resources” and Democratic Senator
Whitehouse opining that “[s]mall businesses form the backbone of the American
economy. When these businesses are struggling, the bankruptcy process should
give them a chance to reorganize to preserve jobs and boost local communities.”).
For perspective on the executive branch, see, e.g., Clare O’Connor, Fourth Time’s
A Charm: How Donald Trump Made Bankruptcy Work for Him, FORBES (Apr.
29, 2011, 7:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2011/04/29/
255
256
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to the federal bankruptcy system, the government can bolster the industry’s access to capital and access to remedies when the capital
runs out. Doing so certainly does not address all the qualms facing
the industry but increases the likelihood that marijuana businesses
and U.S. investors can capitalize on opportunities of the domestic
marijuana industry, regardless of when or how the federal government confronts the increasing divide between state and federal marijuana laws.

fourth-times-a-charm-how-donald-trump-made-bankruptcy-work-forhim/#6cc9f7007ffa. For the judicial branch, see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 244 (1934).

